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This paper finds that, concurrent with the rapid growing index investment in commodities markets
since early 2000s, futures prices of different commodities in the US became increasingly correlated
with each other and this trend was significantly more pronounced for commodities in the two popular
GSCI and DJ-UBS commodity indices. This finding reflects a financialization process of commodities
markets and helps explain the synchronized price boom and bust of a broad set of seemingly unrelated
commodities in the US in 2006-2008. In contrast, such commodity price comovements were absent
in China, which refutes growing commodity demands from emerging economies as the driver.
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 The synchronized rise and fall in prices of oil and a broad set of non-energy commodities in 
2006-2008 has stimulated increasing public attention to commodities markets. Figure 1 depicts 
the price appreciations of oil, wheat, soybeans, copper, cotton, and live cattle since 1991. In 
particular, there is heated debate in policy circles about whether speculation caused unwarranted 
increases in the cost of energy and food and induced excessive price volatility. Policy makers in 
the US and various European countries are actively considering measures to curb speculation.  
There are two opposing views. One of them attributes the boom-and-bust cycle to a simple 
matter of supply and demand, while the other stressing excessive speculation by index investors. 
According to the first view (e.g., Krugman (2008), Hamilton (2009), and Kilian (2009)),  the 
rapid growth of emerging economies such as China propelled the quick increase of world 
demands and caused commodity prices to soar before the summer of 2008. Prices later fell 
sharply when the world recession caused demands to fade. The second view attributes the large 
volatility of commodity prices to distortions caused by large investment flow into commodity 
indices. According to a CFTC staff report (2008) and Masters (2008), the total value of various 
commodity index-related instruments purchased by institutional investors has increased from an 
estimated $15 billion in 2003 to at least $200 billion in mid-2008. A recent report by the US 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2009) argues that the dramatic index 
investment flow had distorted prices of some commodities such as wheat.  
Despite the great public attention on the large increase of commodity price volatility in recent 
years, the concurrent economic transition of commodities markets precipitated by the rapid 
growth of index investment in commodities has gone unnoticed. Prior to early 2000s, despite 
liquid futures contracts traded on many commodities, commodity prices behaved differently 
from that of typical financial assets. Commodity prices provided risk premium for idiosyncratic 
commodity price risk (e.g., Bessembinder (1992) and de Roon, Nijman and Veld (2000)); and 
commodities had little price comovements with stocks (e.g., Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006)) 
and with each other (e.g., Erb and Harvey (2006)). These aspects are in sharp contrast to the 
price dynamics of typical financial assets, which carry premium only for systematic risk and are 
highly correlated with market indices and with each other. This contrast indicates that 
commodities markets were partially segmented from outside financial markets and from each 
other. 
The tide changed in early 2000s, when the collapse of equity market in 2000 and the widely 
publicized discovery of a small negative correlation between commodity returns and stock 
returns led to a belief that commodity futures could be used to reduce portfolio risk. This belief 
allowed investment banks to successfully promote commodity futures as a new asset class for 
prudent investors. As a result, various instruments based on commodity indices have attracted 3 
 
billions of dollars of investment from institutional investors and wealthy individuals. The 
increasing presence of index investors precipitated a fundamental process of financialization 
amongst commodities markets, through which commodity prices became more correlated with 
prices of financial assets and with each other. In this paper, we analyze the effects of this 
financialization process.  
 We focus on the increased price comovements between different commodities after 2004, 
which is roughly the time when significant index investment started to flow into commodities 
markets, to identify the effects of growing commodity index investment. As index investors 
typically focus on strategic portfolio allocation between the commodity class and other asset 
classes such as stocks and bonds, they tend to trade in and out of all commodities in a chosen 
index at the same time (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer (2003)). As a result, their increasing presence 
should have a greater impact on commodities in the two most popular commodity indices – the 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) and Dow-Jones UBS Commodity Index (DJ-UBS) – 
than those off the indices. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that futures prices of non-
energy commodities became increasingly correlated with oil after 2004. In particular, this trend 
was significantly more pronounced for indexed commodities than for those off the indices. While 
this trend intensified after the world financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, its presence was already evident and significant before the crisis.  
There is also evidence of an increasing return correlation between commodities and Morgan 
Stanley emerging market equity index in recent years. This confirms the increasing importance 
of commodity demands from rapidly growing emerging economies in determining commodity 
prices. However, a closer comparison of commodity futures prices in China – the growth engine 
of emerging economies in the 2000s –  with the synchronized boom-and-bust cycle in the US 
uncovers a sharp contrast. In 2006-2008, while futures prices of some commodities heavily 
imported by China, such as heating oil, copper, and soybeans, did experience similar rise and fall 
as those in the US; the prices of some others such as wheat, corn and cotton did not exhibit any 
pronounced cycle. Furthermore, the average return correlation among different commodities in 
China did not display any significant increase in recent years either. Taken together, demands 
from China may have contributed to the price boom and bust of some commodities, but unlikely 
to all commodities at the same time.   
Price comovements among different commodities had also been high in 1970s and early 
1980s. When the US economy was hit by persistent oil supply shocks and stagflation, the 
double-digit inflation rate and accompanied large inflation volatility coincided with a period of 
high return correlations among commodities (with an average around 0.3). In contrast, the 
increases of commodity return correlations in late 2000s were not only larger in magnitude (with 
an average correlation over 0.5) but also different in nature. They emerged when inflation and 4 
 
inflation volatility remained subdued throughout 2000s, and thus inviting explanations other than 
inflation.  
As a result of the financialization process, the price of an individual commodity is no longer 
simply determined by its supply and demand. Instead, commodity prices are also determined by 
a whole set of financial factors, such as the aggregate risk appetite for financial assets, and 
investment behavior of diversified commodity index investors. On one hand, the presence of 
these investors can lead to a more efficient sharing of commodity price risk; on the other hand, 
their portfolio rebalancing can spill over price volatility from outside to commodities markets 
and also across different commodities (e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001)). While the data sample after 
2004 may be too short to give a reliable measure of changes in commodity risk premia, we are 
able to systematically examine the effects of growing index investment on commodity price 
volatility and comovements.  
Overall, our analysis shows that return correlations of commodities with stocks, the US 
dollar, and with each other have significantly increased in recent years. Volatility spillover has 
also contributed to the large price volatility of commodities in 2008, during which indexed non-
energy commodities had larger price volatility than those off-index ones; this difference was 
partially related to the greater return correlations of indexed commodities with oil. These 
changes in commodity price dynamics have profound implications for a wide range of issues 
from commodity producers’ hedging strategies and speculators’ investment strategies to many 
countries’ energy and food policies. We expect these effects to persist as long as index 
investment strategies remain popular among investors.    
Our emphasis on price comovements of commodities is distinct from those in the literature 
on returns and risk premia of commodities, e.g., Fama and French (1987), Bessembinder (1992), 
de Roon, Nijman, and Veld (2000), Erb and Harvey (2006), Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst 
(2007), Hong and Yogo (2009), and Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2009). These papers 
focus on the roles of macroeconomic risk, producers’ hedging incentives, and commodity 
inventories in determining cross-sectional and time-series properties of commodity risk premia.  
Our analysis corroborates with Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) who find that common macro 
shocks cannot fully explain comovements in commodity prices between 1960 and 1985. In 
contrast to their study, our analysis focuses on connecting the large inflow of commodity index 
investment to the large increase of commodity price comovements in recent years by examining 
the difference in these comovements between indexed and off-index commodities. This 
identification strategy builds on the finding of Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) that after a 
stock is added to S&P 500 index, its price comovement with the index increases significantly. 
Several recent papers, e.g., Buyuksahin, Haigh and Robe (2009) and Silvennoinen and Thorp 
(2010), also find that return correlation between commodities and stocks has gone up 5 
 
substantially during the recent financial crisis but not before. Different from these studies, our 
analysis highlights that the increase in commodity return correlations started long before the 
crisis and cannot be simply attributed to the crisis. Instead, we identify the role of index investors 
in linking different commodities markets with each other and with outside financial markets. On 
the latter dimension, our paper complements Etula (2009), who shows that the risk-bearing 
capacity of securities brokers and dealers is an important determinant of risk premia and return 
volatility in commodities markets.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides some background information about 
commodities and commodity indices. Section II documents the increasing return correlations 
among different commodities in recent years. We discuss several economic mechanisms 
including the financialization process of commodities markets for explaining these increases in 
Section III, and examine these mechanisms in Section IV. Section V discusses volatility spillover 
caused by commodity index investment and Section VI concludes the paper.  
I.  Commodities and Commodity Indices 
We focus on commodities with active futures contracts traded in the US. There are 28 such 
commodities available in recent years. We obtain daily futures prices and open interests of these 
commodities from Pinnacle Data Corp.
1 Table 1 lists and classifies these commodities in five 
sectors: energy, grains, softs, livestocks, and metals.
2  
The energy sector contains 4 commodities: WTI (West Texas Intermediate grade) crude oil, 
heating oil, gasoline, and natural gas.
 3 Crude oil is the most important component in this sector 
as heating oil and gasoline are refined oil products, whose prices move closely with crude oil. 
The grain sector contains 9 commodities: corn, Chicago wheat, Kansas wheat, Minneapolis 
wheat, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, rough rice, and oats. These grains are substitutes for 
                                                            
1 Futures contracts were also offered on some other commodities but were later terminated. As our analysis focuses 
on price comovements rather than commodity returns, survivorship bias is not a concern.     
2 See Geman (2005) for a comprehensive description of these commodity sectors and distribution of the global 
supply and demand of each of the commodities.  
3 The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) offers futures contracts on each of them with expirations in every 
month of a year. The WTI crude oil contracts specify a type of light and sweet oil (with 38-40
◦ API and 0.3% sulfur) 
to be delivered at Cushing, Oklahoma. These contracts are heavily traded and their prices are widely used as 
benchmarks for determining the prices of crude oil of different grades and at different locations. The Brent crude oil 
contracts specify a similar grade of oil to be delivered at Shetland Islands, UK. Their prices move closely with those 
of the WTI contracts. The demand and supply fluctuations in the local markets of North America and Europe could 
also cause some variations between the prices of Brent and WTI contracts. We do not include the Brent contracts in 
our sample to avoid potential complications from asynchronous daily closing prices of different commodities 
between the US and London markets. 6 
 
each other as food for humans and animals.
4 The soft sector is a mix of tropics that are grown 
primarily in tropical and subtropical regions. There are 6 commodities in this sector: coffee, 
cotton, sugar, cocoa, lumber and orange juice. We follow the common practice to classify them 
in one sector although the links between the softs are not as close as the links between 
commodities in other sectors. There are four commodities in the livestock sector: feeder cattle, 
lean hogs, live cattle and pork bellies. These commodities are substitutes for each other and are 
primarily used for human consumption. The metal sector contains 5 commodities: gold, silver, 
copper, platinum and palladium.
5 They are used both as investments and as inputs for industrial 
production.   
An increasingly popular investment strategy in the recent years is to invest in a basket of 
commodities following a certain commodity index. A commodity index functions like an equity 
index, such as the S&P 500, in that its value is derived from the total value of a specified basket 
of commodities. Each commodity in the basket is assigned a specified weight. Commodity 
indices typically build on the values of futures contracts, which are typically nearby contracts 
with delivery time longer than one month,
6 to avoid the cost of holding physical commodities. 
When a first-month contract matures and the second-month contract becomes the first-month 
contract, a commodity index specifies the so-called “roll” – i.e., replacing the current contract in 
the index with a following contract. In this way, commodity indices provide returns comparable 
to passive long positions in listed commodity futures contracts. By far the largest two indices by 
market share are the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) and the Dow-Jones UBS 
Commodity Index (DJ-UBS)
 7. There is also a proliferation of other smaller indices operated by 
other institutions, such as the Rogers International and Deutsche Bank Liquid Commodity 
                                                            
4 Soybeans are crushed to produce meal and oil. The three forms constitute the so-called “soybean complex”, each of 
which underlies futures contracts traded on Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). Corn is mostly used as animal 
feed, competing with wheat and soybean meal. In the recent years, corn is also used in the U.S. for producing 
ethanol and other alternative fuels. Wheat is traded on three exchanges: the CME, the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(KCBOT), and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE).  Chicago wheat is a soft winter wheat, grown primarily in 
the central states. It is a low-grade wheat mostly used as livestock feed or as flour for cheap bread. Kansas wheat is a 
hard, red, winter wheat, grown primarily in the southern states, and is used mainly for human food. Minneapolis 
wheat is the highest-grade wheat, planted in the northern states. Rice is the second largest crop in planting acreage 
across the world after wheat. It is primarily used for human consumption. While oats are suitable for human 
consumption as oatmeal and rolled oats, its primary use is as livestock feed. 
5 We exclude several popular metals that are only traded in London, such as aluminum, lead, nickel, zinc, and tin , to 
avoid potential complications from asynchronous daily closing prices of different commodities between the US and 
London markets. 
6 As shown in Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and Hong and Yogo (2009), commodity futures contracts often 
become illiquid in the delivery month. This is because many traders are reluctant to deliver or accept delivery of the 
physical commodities 
7 The Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index was also known as the Dow Jones-AIG Commodity Index before 2009.  7 
 
Indices. These indices differ in terms of index composition, commodity selection criteria, rolling 
mechanism, rebalancing strategy, and weighting scheme.
8  
Table 1 provides the weights of the GSCI and DJ-UBS indices in the 28 commodities traded 
in the US. Both indices incorporate a wide range of commodity futures. There are some 
commodities in neither index: Minneapolis wheat, soybean meal, rough rice, and oats in the 
grain sector; lumber and orange juice in the soft sector; pork bellies in the livestock sector; and 
platinum and palladium in the metal sector. These two indices use different selection and 
weighting schemes: GSCI is weighted by each commodity’s world production, while DJ-UBS 
relies on the relative amount of trading activity of a particular commodity. As a result, 
commodities in these indices tend to be large in terms of world production and liquid in terms of 
trading in the futures markets. The composition of these indices is stable and has stayed the same 
in the recent years. Furthermore, the joint set of GSCI and DJ-UBS indices also covers almost all 
of the commodities in other less popular indices.
9 
The energy sector carries a much greater weight than the other sectors in the GSCI and DJ-
UBS indices. The four energy commodities listed in Table 1 add up to 58% of the GSCI and 39.6% 
of the DJ-UBS. WTI crude oil alone accounts for 40.6% of the GSCI. Since the commodities in 
the energy sector move closely with each other, we will use crude oil as a focal point in our later 
analysis to study price comovements of non-energy commodities with oil. 
II.  The Increased Price Comovements of Commodities 
In this section, we provide some preliminary analysis of the price comovements of individual 
commodities. We illustrate the increased return correlations among seemingly unrelated 
commodities in recent years by plotting one-year rolling return correlations between oil and a 
selected commodity from each of the four non-energy sectors: soybeans from the grain sector, 
                                                            
8 See AIA Research Report (2008) for a detailed account of construction methods of various commodity indices. 
9 Besides directly taking long positions in individual commodity futures contracts, investors can use three types 
of financial instruments to gain exposure to the return of a commodity index: commodity index swaps, exchange 
traded funds, and exchange traded notes. See the recent report by US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations (2009) for a detailed description of these instruments. A commodity index swap is, in essence, a 
financial instrument that pays a return based on the value of a specified index. A swap dealer, such as a bank or 
broker-dealer, typically offers a qualified investor the opportunity to purchase, for a fixed price, a swap whose value 
is linked, on any given date, to the value of the specified commodity index on that date. After selling a swap contract, 
the swap dealer will typically hedge its own exposure to the swap contract by purchasing the corresponding futures 
contracts in the commodity index. In the past few years, financial institutions have devised another type of 
instrument, known as exchange traded funds (ETFs), to mirror the performance of specified commodity indices. 
Unlike commodity index swaps, which are bilateral transactions between investors and swap dealers, ETFs are 
traded in exchanges like stocks. An ETF is typically structured so that the value of the ETF shares should reflect the 
value of the specified commodity index. A third commodity-based instrument involves exchange traded notes 
(ETNs). ETNs are designed and sold by financial institutions to permit retail investors to purchase shares of a debt 
security whose price is linked to that of a commodity index.    8 
 
cotton from the soft sector, live cattle from the livestock sector, and copper from the metal sector. 
These commodities give a broad representation of non-energy commodities. We then construct 
the average return correlation among commodities.   
Since centralized trading makes futures contracts more liquid than physical commodities, 
futures prices are available for a larger set of commodities compared with spot prices. Therefore 
we choose to focus on futures prices of commodities for the most part of our analysis. In Section 
IV.D, we will also analyze correlations of spot returns, which are available only for a smaller set 
of commodities.  
For each commodity, we follow Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and Erb and Harvey (2006) 
to construct a return index from rolling the first-month futures contract. More specifically, we 
construct a hypothetical investment position in the first-month futures contract of the commodity 
on a fully collateralized basis. We hold the contract until the 7
th calendar day of its maturity 
month before rolling into the next contract.
10 The excess return of this hypothetical investment 
on a non-rolling day represents the excess futures return to the initial capital (as we can still earn 
interest on the capital): 
  ,   l n      , ,     l n      ,   ,     
where   , ,    is the date-t price of the first-month futures contract of commodity i with maturity 
date   . On a rolling day, not only does the return incorporate the futures price change, but also 
the price ratio between the first-month contract and the second-month contract.  
We normalize the daily excess return from investing in the commodity in each one-year 
rolling window by its average return and return volatility: 
  , 
        ,                /       . 
We then regress the normalized return   , 
   onto the normalized oil return     , 
  : 
  , 
            , 
      , . 
The estimated coefficient ρ is the return correlation between the two commodities.  
Figure 2 depicts the one-year rolling return correlations of oil with soybeans, cotton, live 
cattle, and copper together with the 95% confidence interval.
 11 Panel A shows that from 1986 to 
                                                            
10 GSCI index is rolled from the fifth to ninth business day of each maturity month with 20% rolled during each day 
of the five-day roll period. DJ-UBS index works similarly. For simplicity, we uniformly specify one-day roll 
strategy on the 7
th calendar of each maturity month for all commodities, including those off-index ones. 
11 Panels B, C, and D start in 1986 because trading of oil futures started only in March 1983. We skip the data in 
1983-1984 to avoid potential liquidity problems at the beginning and use returns after 1985 to measure correlations. 
With the one-year rolling window, our correlation measures start in 1986. Panel D starts in 1990 as trading of copper 
futures started only in January 1989. Panel E starts in 1983 because GSCI energy index is available only after 1982.   9 
 
2004, the return correlation between soybeans and oil moved around zero inside a narrow range 
between -0.1 and 0.2. Between 2004 and late 2009, the correlation steadily climbed up from 0.1 
to near 0.6, and this trend is significantly different from zero. Similarly, Panels B, C, and D show 
that oil had small return correlations with cotton, live cattle, and copper before 2004, and that the 
correlations have gradually risen to 0.5, 0.4, and 0.6, respectively in 2009.
12 We also plot the 
one-year rolling correlation between daily returns of GSCI energy and non-energy indices in 
Panel E. These indices track returns of GSCI commodities (which are listed in Table 1) in the 
energy and non-energy sectors. Their correlation gradually increased from around 0.1 in 2004 to 
over 0.7 in 2009. Taken together, these plots show that return correlations of a broad set of non-
energy commodities with oil were small before 2004, which is consistent with the finding of Erb 
and Harvey (2006), but have been steadily increasing after 2004.  
To have a holistic view of return correlations among non-energy commodities and for the 
period back to 1970s, we construct an average return correlation for all commodities with futures 
contracts traded at a given time. As commodities in the same sector tend to have greater return 
correlations with each other than with commodities in other sectors, we need to avoid the 
potential bias caused by changes of commodity distribution across different sectors.   We deal 
with this issue using the following method:  For each sector, we construct an index which tracks 
the equal-weighted return of all available commodities. Then we compute the return correlations 
between these indices for all sector pairs, and take the equal-weighted average. To highlight the 
difference between commodities in and off the two popular commodity indices, we construct two 
return indices in each sector and calculate the average correlations separately for indexed and 
off-index commodities. We call a commodity “indexed” if it is in either the GSCI or DJ-UBS 
index, and “off-index” otherwise. 
Figure 3 depicts the average one-year rolling correlations of indexed and off-index 
commodities from 1973 to 2009. The plot illustrates several interesting features. The average 
correlation among indexed commodities stayed at a stable level below 0.1 throughout 1990s and 
early 2000s and was indistinguishable from that among off-index commodities.  The mild 
increase in average correlation among off-index commodities to a level of 0.2 in 2009 is in sharp 
contrast to that among indexed commodities, which has climbed up to an unprecedented level of 
0.5. This difference in the increase in correlations between indexed and off-index commodities 
allows us to identify the effects of index investment later in our analysis.  
                                                            
12 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) point out that when volatility increases, return correlation can be a biased measure of 
the economic link between assets. We have also adopted the procedure proposed by them to adjust for such biases. 
The adjustment does not create any significant change to the return correlation plots. More importantly, we will 
directly test for changes in the links between non-energy commodities and oil by using formal regression analysis.  
In computing t-stats for testing the changes, we adjust for heteroskedasticity. 10 
 
Figure 3 also shows that the average correlations of indexed and off-index commodities had 
been as high as 0.3 in 1970s. As we will discuss in Section III.D, this coincided with the wild 
inflation and inflation volatility during that period. The average correlations gradually declined 
below 0.1 in late 1980s as inflation and inflation volatility were eventually tamed. Interestingly, 
there were no pronounced differences between indexed and off-index commodities despite the 
high correlation levels in the 1970s. Furthermore, inflation and inflation volatility remained 
subdued even to date. The contrast between the high return correlations in 1970s and 2000s 
indicates that they were driven by different mechanisms. Our analysis focuses on understanding 
the latter period.     
III.  Economic Mechanisms 
What caused the increases of return correlations among seemingly unrelated commodities in 
recent years? In this section, we discuss several possible economic mechanisms including 
growing commodity demands from emerging economies and the financialization process of 
commodities markets precipitated by the rapid growth of commodity index investment.  
A.  Rapid Growth of Emerging Economies 
The rapid growth of China, India, and other emerging economies is a popular explanation for 
the recent commodity price boom (e.g., Krugman (2008), Hamilton (2009), and Kilian (2009)). 
The economic development of these emerging economies in 2000s stimulated unprecedented 
demands for a broad range of commodities in different sectors, such as energy and metals, and 
thus might have led to a joint price boom of these commodities.     
The commodity demands from the emerging economies depend positively on the strength of 
their economic growth and negatively on the price of the US dollar, which is widely used to 
settle commodity transactions. We use the Morgan Stanley emerging market equity index to 
proxy for the economic growth of emerging economies. This index tracks equity market 
performance of the global emerging markets. As of May 2005, this index consists of 26 
emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela. This broad 
representation makes this index a good proxy for the economic growth of the global emerging 
economies. We use return of the US dollar index futures traded on ICE to track price fluctuations 
of the US dollar. The underlying of this futures contract is an index that weighs dollar exchange 
rates with six component currencies (euro, Japanese yen, British pound, Canadian dollar, 
Swedish krona and Swiss franc). We obtain data on these two indices from Bloomberg. 11 
 
Figure 4 depicts the one-year rolling correlation between daily returns of GSCI index and 
Morgan Stanley emerging market equity index. Before 2004, the correlation fluctuated mostly 
around zero, except that it dropped to a negative level of -0.4 during the Gulf war in 1990-1992. 
The war caused stock prices to fall and oil price to soar. Interestingly, after 2004 the correlation 
rose gradually from around 0 to above 0.5 in 2009. This increasing trend confirms an 
increasingly important effect of emerging economies on commodity prices in recent years.  
Figure 4 also shows a clear decreasing trend in return correlation between the GSCI index 
and US dollar index. Before 2004, this correlation fluctuated inside a narrow band between -0.2 
and 0.2. After 2004, it dropped steadily from around 0 to -0.4 in 2009. This trend is consistent 
with growing commodity demands from emerging economies. As we will discuss later, this trend 
is also consistent with increasing index investment flow into commodities markets from outside 
US. In our regression analysis later, we will formally examine the links of the GSCI index to the 
emerging market index and the US dollar index. We will also use the emerging market index to 
control for the effects of commodity demands from emerging economies in our analysis of price 
comovements of non-energy commodities with oil.  
Despite the important effects of emerging economies on commodity prices, it remains 
unclear whether they were the driver of the synchronized price boom and bust across the broad 
range of commodities in 2006-2008. To address this question, we collect futures prices of 
commodities traded in China, the growth engine of emerging economies in the 2000s, from Wind 
(a widely used vendor of financial data in China). China gradually introduced futures contracts 
on a small set of commodities since late 1990s. Table 1 lists these commodities and the starting 
dates of futures trading in China. Figure 5 depicts front-month futures prices for six commodities 
in China and the US.
13 Panels A, B and C show that futures prices of heating oil, copper and 
soybeans in China had boom-and-bust cycles closely matched with the corresponding cycles in 
the US. These closely matched price dynamics are consistent with the heavy imports of these 
commodities by China. More interestingly, Panels D, E, and F show that the price dynamics of 
wheat, corn, and cotton in China are very different from those in the US.. In the US, these 
commodities experienced boom-and-bust cycles well synchronized with other commodities with 
peaks in early 2008. In contrast, their prices in China did not display any pronounced cycle. As 
China was not a major importer or exporter of wheat, corn, and cotton, the large (explicit or 
implicit) cost of transporting these commodities across the Pacific prevents effective arbitrage of 
price deviations between China and the US. However, the lack of price cycles for these 
                                                            
13 Commodity prices in China are settled in Renminbi. We normalize the price of each commodity in both China and 
US to be 100 at the beginning of its sample period. Renminbi had a steady appreciation of about 20% against dollar 
from 2005 to 2009. Adjusting the exchange rate fluctuation does not affect the price boom-and-bust cycles in the 
plots. The exchange rate has no effect on commodity price comovements in China either.   12 
 
commodities in China indicates that the synchronized price boom and bust in the US were not 
driven by demands from China.  
To compare commodity return correlations in China and the US, we pool together a sample 
of 8 commodities with futures contracts simultaneously traded in China and the US. These 
commodities include heating oil in the energy sector; corn, wheat and soybeans in the grain 
sector; cotton and sugar in the soft sector; and copper and gold in the metal sector. We match the 
front-month futures returns of these commodities with the corresponding ones in the US. We use 
the same procedure we used before to first construct an equal-weighted return index for each 
commodity sector in China and in the US based on all commodities available in China. We then 
compute an equal-weighted average of the one-year rolling correlations for all sector pairs in 
each of the countries. Figure 6 depicts the average commodity return correlations in China and 
the US from 2000 to 2009. These two correlations were roughly at the same levels around 0.1 in 
early 2000s. Interestingly, the average correlation in the US had increased steadily to a level 
above 0.5 in late 2000s, while the average correlation in China did not grow much and stayed 
below 0.2 throughout the same period. This contrast again refutes commodity demands from 
China as the driver of the large increase of commodity price comovements in the US.     
B.  Financialization of Commodities 
The focus of our analysis is the new development in commodities markets – the large inflow 
of index investment in recent years. When equity market collapsed in 2000, the widely 
publicized discovery of a negative correlation between commodity returns and stock returns by 
Greer (2000), Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006), and Erb and Harvey (2006) in the investment 
communities allowed Goldman Sachs and other indexers to successfully promote commodity 
futures as a new asset class for institutional investors. As a result, commodities markets attracted 
billions of dollars of investment from financial institutions, insurance companies, pension funds, 
foundations, hedge funds, and wealthy individuals. Figure 7 depicts the rapid growth in the open 
interest (total number of contracts outstanding with maturities less than one year) of various 
commodity futures after 2004.  
B.1.    Index Investment Flow 
The Commodity Index Traders (CIT) report, released by the US Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) on each Friday, allows us to measure how much index investment has 
flowed into a set of commodities after 2006. The report shows positions of index traders, which 
include swap dealers, pension funds, and other investment funds that trade commodity indices 13 
 
for 12 agricultural commodities since 1/3/2006.
14 These include corn, soybeans, Chicago wheat, 
Kansas wheat, and soybean oil from the grain sector; coffee, cotton, sugar, and cocoa from the 
soft sector; and feeder cattle, lean hogs, and live cattle from the livestock sector. This list 
coincides with the joint set of GSCI and DJ-UBS indices in these three sectors. The CIT report 
does not cover any commodities in the energy and metal sectors. 
   
The CIT report classifies the reportable market participants into three groups: commercial 
traders, index traders, and non-commercial traders. The CFTC identifies an individual reportable 
trader as commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular commodity for hedging. 
The non-commercial traders include all reportable traders who are neither commercial nor index 
traders. The CIT report provides the aggregate long and short positions of each of the three 
groups in a particular commodity.
15  
Table 2 reports the average position size of each group of traders in each of the commodities 
based on the weekly CIT report from 1/3/2006 to 10/29/2009. The table shows that index traders’ 
long positions contribute to a substantial fraction of open interest of each of the commodities: an 
average of 28.4% across all the commodities in the sample, 42.4% of lean hogs and 41.6% of 
Chicago wheat respectively at the high end. Index traders’ short positions are minimal, with an 
average of 1.6% of open interest across commodities. 
We can construct the investment flow by index traders in and out of the 12 commodities in 
each week by summing up the dollar value of index traders’ net position change in each of the 
commodities:  
      ∑     ,        ,      ,   
  
                    (1) 
where    ,  represents the net long position of index traders in commodity i in week t and   ,    
is the price of the commodity in week t-1. In this calculation, we use prices of first-month futures 
contracts, and assume that all position changes occur during the previous week. Then we add up 
the index flow from the first week of 2006, the beginning of the CIT report data, to any week 
before 10/29/2009 to obtain the accumulated index flow to that week.  
Figure 8 depicts the accumulated index flow together with the GSCI agriculture & livestock 
excess return index. This index follows the performance of the same three sectors – grains, softs, 
and livestocks – as those covered by the CIT report. The figure shows that since the beginning of 
2006, these three sectors had a large net inflow which accumulated to nearly 20 billion dollars in 
                                                            
14 The CIT report supplements the standard Commitments of Traders (COT) report, which is also released by the 
CFTC on the breakdown of every Tuesday’s positions on all exchange-traded futures and options on US-based 
exchanges. The COT report only classifies reportable traders to two categories, commercial and non-commercial.  
15 The CIT report also presents the non-commercial traders’ aggregate spreading positions, i.e., equal long and short 
futures position on the same commodity but with different maturities. 14 
 
early 2008. Then there was a stream of outflow, which led to an accumulated index flow of 
negative 5 billion dollars by March 2009.  The figure also shows that fluctuations of the GSCI 
agriculture & livestock excess return index were in striking sync with the index flow.  
B.2.   Economic Effects 
There is evidence suggesting that before early 2000s, commodities markets were partially 
segmented from outside financial markets and from each other. Erb and Harvey (2006) show that 
commodities had only small positive return correlations with each other; Gorton and 
Rouwenhorst (2006) show that commodity returns had negligible correlations with the S&P 500 
stock index return, especially at short horizons such as daily and monthly; Bessembinder (1992) 
and de Roon, Nijman and Veld (2000) find that returns of commodity futures increased with net 
short positions of commodity hedgers after controlling for systematic risk. These attributes 
contrast those of typical financial assets such as stocks, where prices carry premium only for 
systematic risk, and tend to have high return correlations with each other (even if they share little 
common fundamentals). 
The segmentation of commodities markets implies potentially inefficient sharing of 
commodity price risk, which is also consistent with the longstanding hedging pressure theory of 
commodity prices dating back to Keynes (1930), Hicks (1939), and more recently Hirshleifer 
(1988). This influential theory posits that commodity hedgers need to offer positive risk premium 
to induce speculators to share the idiosyncratic risk of the long positions they are endowed with.  
Since index investors tend to hold large diversified portfolios across different asset classes, their 
increasing presence is likely to improve the sharing of commodity price risk. However, as is well 
known, measuring risk premium requires a long sample period. The 5-year period currently 
available since 2004(roughly when significant index investment started to flow into commodities) 
is perhaps too short to identify the resulting change in commodity risk premium, which we will 
leave for future research.  
Trading of diversified index investors can act as a channel to correlate commodity prices 
with prices of other assets in their portfolios (e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001)). The exact nature of 
such spillover effects depends on the index investors’ portfolio composition and rebalancing 
strategies. Since commodity index investors usually invest a large fraction of their portfolios in 
stocks, commodity prices are exposed to shocks to stocks. When a positive shock increases the 
weight of stocks in the investors’ portfolios, diversification incentives motivate them to move 
some money into commodities, and thus causing commodity prices to comove positively with 
stock prices. On the other hand, index investors’ strategic asset allocation from stocks to 
commodities or vice versa can also cause commodity prices to comove negatively with stock 
prices. Furthermore, the rapid growth of commodity index investment is a global phenomenon 15 
 
and a significant fraction of the investment flow comes from international investors who are 
exposed to shocks to the US dollar exchange rate. When the US dollar appreciates, the same 
commodity with prices in dollars becomes more expensive to international investors. As a result, 
their demands decrease and cause commodity prices to comove negatively with the US dollar 
exchange rate. We will further discuss these spillover effects in Section V.     
Our main identification strategy of the increasing presence of commodity index investors 
builds on the return correlations among different commodities. Index investors are not 
particularly sensitive to prices of individual commodities since they tend to move in and out of 
all commodities in their index at the same time based on the strategic allocation of their capital to 
commodities versus other asset classes such as stocks and bonds. As a result, any shocks to their 
strategic allocation to the commodity class can cause commodities in the index to move together 
(e.g., Barberis and Shleifer (2003)). In other words, we expect price comovements of 
commodities in the GSCI and DJ-UBS indices to be greater than those off the indices. Consistent 
with this theory, Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) find that in stock markets, addition to the 
S&P 500 index can significantly increase a stock’s return correlation with the index. Motivated 
by these studies, we focus on the difference between return correlations of indexed and off-index 
commodities with oil. We choose oil as a focal point because of its dominant weight in the two 
popular aforementioned commodity indices. In particular, we examine the following empirical 
hypothesis on the change in this difference after 2004: 
  After 2004, non-energy commodities in the GSCI and DJ-UBS indices had greater 
increases of return correlations with oil than those off the indices. 
An implicit assumption in this hypothesis is that other participants of commodities markets, 
such as traditional speculators, commodity producers, and commercial users only have a limited 
capacity to absorb trades of index investors. As a result, the increasing presence of index 
investors can affect commodity prices. It is also worth mention that potential substitutions 
between closely related commodities by consumers and producers can partially transmit the price 
impact of index investors to off-index commodities.
16 For example, if prices of corn rise far 
above those of soybean meal, consumers will substitute soybean meal for corn to feed their 
animals, or vice versa. Similarly, if prices of corn rise far above those of oats, farmers will 
allocate more farmland to plant corn instead of oats. But these substitution effects are likely to be 
imperfect and operate at horizons longer than those of futures trading such as the daily horizon 
we focus on in this paper.  
                                                            
16 See Casassus, Liu and Tang (2009) for a study of multi-commodity systems with production, substitution and 
complementary relationships. 16 
 
The choice of the year 2004 as the break point is not important because our main results 
build on trends in return correlations between non-energy commodities and oil. While the data 
sample after 2004 may be too short for identifying changes in risk premium, the use of daily data 
allows us to reliably measure changes in return volatility and correlation.  
As mentioned before, commodities in the GSCI and DJ-UBS indices are selected based on 
their world production and trading liquidity in futures markets. Hence, the higher liquidity of 
indexed commodities works against this hypothesis because it is less likely for prices of more 
liquid commodities to be affected by trading of index investors. Liquidity might be a concern for 
off-index commodities because it can cause price fluctuations of off-index commodities to lag 
behind oil. We will account for this effect by introducing lags in our regression analysis later. 
One might argue that trading by index investors has a greater impact on commodities that 
carry a greater weight in the commodity indices. However, as their index weights, are matched 
by their greater world production and higher trading liquidity in futures markets by construction, 
we expect these commodities to be able to absorb more capital inflow and outflow. For this 
reason, we choose to focus on the difference in return correlations between commodities in and 
off the GSCI and DJ-UBS indices, rather than between commodities with greater and smaller 
weights in the indices. 
As the GSCI and DJ-UBS indices are built on rolling front-month futures contracts of 
individual commodities, most of our analysis focuses on returns from rolling these front-month 
futures contracts. A subtle issue is whether the growth of index investment has affected spot 
prices and futures prices of other maturities in the same way. This depends on the effectiveness 
of arbitrageurs in synchronizing spot prices and futures prices with different maturities. The 
standard textbook example on commodity carry trades works as follows: If the price of the front-
month futures contract of a commodity becomes too expensive relative to its spot price after 
adjusting for interest cost and storage cost for carrying the commodity from now to the delivery 
date of the contract, an arbitrage opportunity emerges and the arbitrageur can short the contract 
while simultaneously carrying the commodity. Mismatches in the relative prices of futures 
contracts with different maturities can also lead to similar arbitrage opportunities. Thus, we 
expect arbitrageurs to spread the price impact of index investment from front-month futures 
contracts to spot prices and futures prices of other maturities if the interest cost and storage cost 
incurred in such carry trades are independent of growing index investment. In Section IV.D, we 




C.  The World Financial Crisis 
It is well known that prices of financial assets tend to move together during financial crises. 
Could the recent increase of commodity return correlations be a simple reflection of the recent 
financial crisis?  
Figure 9 depicts the VIX index (i.e., Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index), a 
widely used measure of equity market volatility derived from the implied volatility of S&P 500 
index options. The VIX index mostly stayed near its lowest level around 10% from 2004 to 2007. 
It gradually climbed up but nevertheless remained below 30% (a normal level from its past) in 
2007 and the first half of 2008. Only in September 2008, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, 
the VIX index suddenly shot up from 20% to near 70%. The dramatic rise of the VIX index is 
widely regarded as the indicator for the disruption of a full-scale crisis in the financial markets 
across the world. The VIX index declined below 30% in May 2009 as the crisis abated.  
The timing of the financial crisis did not coincide with the increase of commodity return 
correlations, which has already started in 2004 – long before the dramatic jump-up of the VIX 
index in September 2008. As a result, the financial crisis cannot fully explain the increase of 
commodity return correlations. In our regression analysis later, we will separately treat the pre-
crisis period before September 2008 to isolate the effect of the crisis.   
On the other hand, the crisis also provides an extreme episode for us to examine the effects of 
financialization on commodities markets. If commodities markets were segmented from outside 
financial markets, we would not expect a crisis outside to have any significant effect on 
commodities markets. Figure 10 depicts the one-year rolling correlation between the GSCI and 
S&P 500 stock index. This figure illustrates a widely noted correlation increase: While this 
correlation stayed in a band between -0.2 and 0.1 for several years before 2008, it quickly 
climbed up from 0 to over 0.5 during the crisis and remained high even after the crisis abated in 
early 2009.
17  This largely increased correlation not only shows that commodities markets 
became more integrated with outside financial markets, but also suggests potential volatility 
spillover from outside to commodities markets through trading of index investors, which we will 
examine in Section V.  
  
                                                            
17 See also a recent article in the Wall Street Journal (August 16, 2010) based on price fluctuations of oil and S&P 
500 stock index in 2010: “Oil gets a new dance partner: stocks” by Carolyn Cui. 18 
 
 
D.   Inflation 
Inflation is a common factor that drives prices of different commodities. Could the recent 
increase in commodity return correlations be driven by the increasingly important effects of 
inflation on commodity prices?  
Figure 11 depicts the annualized monthly CPI core inflation rate (the percentage change of 
Consumer Price Index excluding food and energy prices) and the one-year rolling volatility of 
the monthly CPI core inflation rate. We use the CPI core inflation rate to avoid the 
contamination of inflation measure by commodity prices. This inflation rate hovered near 10% 
throughout 1970s when the economy was hit by persistent oil supply shocks and stagflation. The 
inflation rate remained high around 5% during the 1980s. It was eventually tamed in 1990s and 
remained low at 2 to 3% levels throughout late 1990s and 2000s. The volatility of the inflation 
rate has a similar pattern as the inflation rate. It was often above 5% in 1970s and early 1980s, 
and remained above 3% from early 1980s to early 1990s. After mid 1990s, the inflation volatility 
gradually declined to a level around 1% in early 2000s and remained at this level during 2000s. 
Interestingly, in 2000s the commodity return correlations depicted in Figures 2 and 3 show time 
trends opposite to those of the inflation rate and inflation volatility. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
recent increase in commodity return correlations were driven by inflation.  
E.  Adoption of Biofuel 
Another recent development in commodities markets is the wide adoption of biofuel. To 
reduce the reliance on oil as the main source of energy, many countries including the US have 
adopted new energy policies to promote the use of biofuel. The 2005 US energy bill mandated 
that 7.5 billion gallons of ethanol be used by 2012. The 2007 energy bill further increased the 
mandate to 36 billion by 2022. The combination of ethanol subsidies and high oil prices led to a 
rapid growth of the ethanol industry, which now consumes about one third of the US corn 
production. The rise of the ethanol industry might have caused prices of corn and other close 
substitutes such as soybeans and wheat to comove with oil prices. As corn is also a major source 
of livestock feed, this effect may have also affected prices of livestock commodities.  
A recent study by Roberts and Schlenker (2010) provides a quantitative estimate of the 
impact of the US ethanol mandate on food prices. By directly estimating demand and supply 
elasticities of agricultural commodities based on crop-yield fluctuations resulted from random 
weather shocks, this study shows that the growth of ethanol production can cause food prices to 
increase by 20-30 percent. While this estimate is significant, it is still too small to explain the 
near quadruple of corn price from about $2.00 per bushel in 2006 to almost $8.00 per bushel in 19 
 
2008. More importantly, the growth of ethanol production can explain neither the synchronized 
price booms of commodities unrelated to food such as cotton and coffee, nor the greater increase 
in return correlations among indexed commodities than among off-index commodities. 
IV.  Regression Analysis 
We now use regression analysis to examine the effects of the aforementioned economic 
mechanisms on commodity prices in recent years. We first analyze the GSCI index return,
18 and 
then analyze price comovements of non-energy commodities with oil.  
A.  GSCI Index Return  
We first examine links of the GSCI index return with a set of economic variables, which we 
choose to capture the economic mechanisms discussed in the previous section. We include return 
of Morgan Stanley emerging market equity index     , ) and the global shipping index (    , ), 
which was constructed by Kilian (2009) based on an average of dry cargo single voyage freight 
rates, to represent effects caused by the rapid growth of emerging economies. We also include 
returns of the S&P 500 US equity index     , ), JP Morgan Treasury bond index      , ), and the 
US dollar index (    ,   which capture the key links of commodity prices with equity market, 
interest rate and dollar exchange rate. As we discussed before, these links are subject to different 
forces at work. For example, the link with the dollar exchange rate is affected by both demands 
for physical commodities from emerging economies and demands for index investment from 
international investors; the links with equity market and interest rate may reflect effects of 
economic fundamentals, as well as portfolio rebalancing of index investors. Finally, we also 
examine the link of GSCI return with CPI inflation rate      ,  . We will separately treat the link 
with CPI inflation rate and CPI core inflation rate (which excludes food and energy prices).  
Morgan Stanley emerging market equity index, S&P 500 US equity index, JP Morgan 
Treasury bond index, and the US dollar index are available at daily frequencies, and are obtained 
from Bloomberg and Datastream. CPI inflation rate and the global shipping index are only 
available at monthly frequencies and are obtained from the websites of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and Lutz Kilian. Our sample goes from 1/4/1988 to 10/29/2009, the longest period 
during which all of these variables are available. This sample is sufficient for our focus on 
analyzing changes in the links of GSCI return with these variables after 2004.
19  
                                                            
18 The correlation between returns of GSCI and DJ-UBS indices is over 0.9. As a result, analyzing DJ-UBS return 
provides very similar results to those from analyzing GSCI return. Thus, we only report results on GSCI return. 
19 We are not particularly interested in an elaborate analysis of these links further back to the past. Instead, we refer 
readers to other studies, such as Erb and Harvey (2006) and Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006), for links of 
commodity prices with broader sets of economic variables over longer sample periods. 20 
 
We use the following regression specification: 
     , 
                                      2004     , 
                      2004     , 
            (2) 
                                           2004      , 
                      2004      , 
   
                                                   2004      , 
                      2004      , 
       
where       is an indicator function which takes a value of 1 if time t is later than 2004 and 0 
otherwise. We normalize every variable by its sample mean and standard deviation (as marked 
by the superscript   on each variable) so that the regression coefficients in a univariate regression 
can be interpreted as the correlation between the right-hand-side and left-hand-side variables. To 
highlight the potential changes in the links of GSCI return with the right-hand-side variables 
after 2004, we impose a linear trend after 2004 in each of the regression coefficients. For 
example, the coefficient of     ,  consists of a pre-2004 level    and a linear trend           
2004  with    as the slope of the trend. This linear trend specification is consistent with the 
gradual increased return correlations of commodities with each other and with other variables 
that are highlighted in Figures 2, 3, and 4. This specification allows us to conveniently test the 
changes in the return correlations of GSCI return with the right-hand-side variables after 2004, 
even though we expect these trends to eventually stabilize.
20   
We analyze this regression in both daily and monthly frequencies.  We first examine the pre-
crisis period before September 2008 to isolate potential effects of the recent financial crisis, and 
then we examine the full sample period which extends to the end of October 2009. Table 3 
reports the regression results for using the right-hand-side variables individually and jointly, and 
for the pre-crisis period and the full sample period. Panel A covers regressions of the daily data, 
while Panel B covers the monthly data.  
While there was a negligible link between returns of the GSCI index and the emerging 
market index before 2004 (i.e., the estimates of    in different regressions are all insignificant), a 
positive trend appeared after 2004. This trend (i.e., the    coefficient) is highly significant in the 
daily regressions in both of the pre-crisis period and full sample period. Although the t-stats 
become insignificant possibly due to the smaller sample size, the magnitudes of the    estimates 
in the monthly regressions remain similar to those in the daily regressions. This positive trend 
confirms Figure 4 regarding the increasingly important link between commodity prices and 
emerging economies in recent years. The estimates of    are positive and significant, indicating 
that commodity prices are positively correlated with the cost of transporting goods across the 
world. This is consistent with the finding of Kilian (2009) that global economic activity has an 
                                                            
20 In a previous version of this paper, we have also used specifications that use dummies for individual years after 
2004. These specifications give similar results as the linear trend specification, although more cumbersome. For 
brevity of the presentation, we do not present the results based on year-dummies here.    21 
 
important effect on oil prices. However the estimates of    are insignificant, indicating little 
changes in this relationship after 2004. Overall, these results confirm the important effects of 
commodity demands from emerging markets on commodity prices. 
Table 3 also shows small but significant negative return correlations of the GSCI index with 
S&P 500 equity index and JP Morgan Treasury bond index before 2004 as reflected by estimates 
of    and    in the daily and monthly regressions. These negative correlations are consistent with 
the findings of Greer (2000), Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and Erb and Harvey (2006). There 
were negligible changes in these return correlations between 2004 and September 2008 because 
the estimates of    and    are all insignificant in the pre-crisis period. These estimates become 
highly significant in the full sample period, suggesting significant changes after the financial 
crisis in September 2008. In particular, return correlation of GSCI with S&P equity index has 
increased, while with JP Morgan bond index has decreased. These changes are consistent with 
index investors flying away from risky stocks and commodities and invest in riskless Treasury 
bonds during the crisis (e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001)). These results also confirm the findings of 
Buyuksahin, Haigh and Robe (2009) and Silvennoinen and Thorp (2010) that return correlation 
between GSCI and S&P indices went up during the crisis, but not before the crisis.  
While there was an insignificant link between the GSCI return and the US dollar return 
before 2004 (as reflected by the insignificant estimates of   ), a negative trend appeared after 
2004 (as reflected by the estimates of   ). This trend is negative and significant in the daily and 
monthly regressions and in both of the pre-crisis period and full sample period. This trend, as we 
discussed before, is consistent with the hypotheses based on the rapid growth of emerging 
economies and the increase in commodity index investment, and confirms the illustration in 
Figure 4. 
It is well known that commodity prices comove positively with inflation rate, albeit 
pronounced only at long horizons such as 1-year and 5-year horizons, e.g., Greer (2000), Gorton 
and Rouwenhorst (2006) and Erb and Harvey (2006). In Panel B of Table 3, the estimates of     
and      for the monthly CPI inflation rate and CPI core inflation rate are all insignificant, 
indicating insignificant correlations between GSCI return and inflation rate in 1990s and 2000s. 
This is consistent with our earlier discussion that inflation does not appear to have an important 
effect on commodity prices during this period, especially on commodity price fluctuations at 
daily and monthly horizons.  
B.  Price Comovements of Non-energy Commodities with Oil  
We now examine whether the increasing presence of index investors contributed to the 
increase in return correlations of non-energy commodities with oil. To identify this effect, we 
focus on the difference between the increased correlations of indexed and off-index commodities 22 
 
after 2004. We pool together daily returns of first-month futures contracts of all non-energy 
commodities from 1/2/1998 to 10/29/2009. We choose this sample period so that there are six 
years before 1/1/2004 and roughly six years afterwards. As we discussed before, there is not 
much difference between the return correlations of indexed and off-index commodities in the 
earlier period. Extending the sample period further back does not affect our result.    
We specify the following panel regression of the normalized commodity returns   , 
   on the 
normalized return of oil     , 
  , and a set of control variables including the normalized returns of 
the Morgan Stanley emerging market equity index    , 
  , S&P 500 US equity index    , 
   JP 
Morgan Treasury bond index     , 
  , and US dollar index     , 
  :  
  , 
                   2004                  2004                   , 
            (3) 
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       is an indicator function with a value of 1 if the commodity is in either the GSCI or DJ-UBS 
index, and 0 otherwise. We include returns of the Morgan Stanley emerging market equity index 
and the US dollar index to control for the effect of commodity demands from emerging 
economies. As we discussed before, the dollar return might also pick up effects by international 
index investors. Thus, this control might be excessive. We also include returns of the S&P stock 
index and the JP Morgan Treasury bond index to control for the effects of the recent financial 
crisis. Again, these controls might be excessive because the spillover of the financial crisis to 
commodities markets may be caused by trading of index investors.     
Motivated by our earlier analysis, we specify a linear trend after 2004 in the regression 
coefficient of each independent variable. Specifically, we decompose each regression coefficient 
into three components. Figure 12 provides a graphical account of this decomposition. For 
example, in the coefficient of oil return, the first component     measures the baseline coefficient 
(specific to the individual commodity i) before 2004; the second component        2004         
captures a common trend in the coefficient after 2004 with    as the slope of the trend; and the 
third component        2004               measures the additional trend after 2004 with    as the 
slope of the trend if the commodity is in at least one of the GSCI and DJ-UBS indices. The last 
component captures the difference in the changes after 2004 between the return correlations of 
indexed and off-index commodities with oil. Our key hypothesis is that    is  significantly 
positive, which implies that the increasing presence of index investors has led to a greater 
increase in return correlations of indexed commodities with oil than that of off-index 23 
 
commodities. We also decompose the regression coefficient on each of the control variables in 
the same way to control for possible trends driven by other economic mechanisms. 
We analyze this regression in the full sample with all non-energy commodities, as well as in 
several sub-samples including the soybean complex (which includes soybeans, soybean meal, 
and soybean oil), the grain sector, the soft sector, the livestock sector, and the metal sector. We 
separately examine the pre-crisis period from 1/2/1998 to 8/31/2008 and the full sample period 
from 1/2/1998 to 10/29/2009 in order to isolate the crisis effect. For each of the periods, we first 
analyze the regression with only oil return and then together with the control variables. Table 4 
reports the regression results.  
Panel A reports the results from the full sample with all non-energy commodities. The 
estimates of coefficients     show that most of the non-energy commodities had a small and 
positive return correlation with oil before 2004, with gold having the highest estimate of 0.15.  
Several commodities from the soft and livestock sectors had a small negative return correlation 
with oil; these commodities include live cattle, feeder cattle, coffee, cocoa, lumber, orange juice, 
and pork bellies. These small return correlations are consistent with the finding of Erb and 
Harvey (2006). 
The estimates of    and    in both of the pre-crisis and full sample periods are positive and 
significant. These estimates suggest that there was a significant and increasing trend in return 
correlations of non-energy commodities with oil after 2004. More importantly, this increasing 
trend is significantly stronger for indexed commodities than for off-index commodities. This 
pattern is robust to including the control variables in the regressions and thus supports the 
hypothesis that the increasing presence of index investors led prices of indexed commodities to 
comove more with oil. Furthermore, this effect was present before the disruption of the financial 
crisis in September 2008.  
In the pre-crisis period with the control variables, the estimates of     and     are 0.04 and 
0.02 respectively. These values imply that the return correlation between an off-index non-
energy commodity and oil increased by 0.04 each year. At this rate, the correlation had an 
accumulative increase of 0.2 between 2004 and 2009. The return correlation between an indexed 
non-energy commodity and oil had an extra increase of 0.02 each year.  Thus its accumulative 
increase between 2004 and 2009 was 0.3, which is substantial in economic terms.   
Panel B of Table 4 also reports the estimates of     and    in each commodity sub-sample in 
both of the pre-crisis and full sample periods after including the control variables in the 
regressions. The estimates are consistently positive and significant across the sub-samples except 
in the livestock sector, in which the estimate of    is zero and the estimate of    is positive but 
significant only for the full sample period.  Taken together, the increased price comovements 
between indexed non-energy commodities and oil were not driven by a few commodities 24 
 
concentrated in one sector; instead, our result about the increased price comovements is robust 
across different sub-samples of commodities.  
We have also examined the regression in (3) based on weekly commodity returns. The 
estimates of    and     are positive with similar magnitudes as those reported in Table 4. 
However, their t-stats are less significant. This is consistent with our earlier discussion that we 
need to use daily data to measure return correlation in order to compensate for the relatively 
short sample period after 2004.    
Panel A of Table 4 reveals several interesting observations about the return correlations of 
non-energy commodities with the control variables. First, there is a significant and positive trend 
in their return correlations with the emerging market index after 2004 in both of the pre-crisis 
and full sample periods, as reflected by the positive and significant estimates of coefficient κ . 
This is consistent with the increasing return correlation between the GSCI index and the 
emerging market index after 2004. However, there is a negligible difference between indexed 
and off-index commodities in the increase of their return correlations with the emerging market 
index, as reflected by the insignificant estimates of κ . This lack of difference is consistent with 
the fact that the effects of commodity demands from emerging economies are independent of the 
commodity indices. It also indirectly confirms the discriminating power of our identification 
strategy based on the difference-in-difference effect.   
Furthermore, the estimates of coefficient    are negative, with a significant t-stat in the full 
sample period although an insignificant one in the pre-crisis period. These estimates suggest a 
negative trend in the return correlations of non-energy commodities with the US dollar after 
2004, which is consistent with the decreasing trend in the return correlation between the GSCI 
index and the US dollar index. More interestingly, the estimates of coefficient    are  also 
negative, with a significant t-stat in the pre-crisis period although an insignificant one in the full 
sample period. These estimates indicate that the decreasing trend is stronger for indexed 
commodities than for off-index commodities. This difference-in-difference result suggests that 
the decreasing trend in  return correlations of non-energy commodities with the US dollar was 
not all driven by commodity demands from emerging economies and was at least partially 
related to trading by international index investors in commodities markets. 
C.  Controlling for Illiquidity 
Because off-index commodities tend to be less liquid, there is a potential concern that their 
price fluctuations might lag behind that of oil and thus have smaller contemporaneous return 
correlations with oil than indexed commodities. To ensure that illiquidity is not the reason for the 
less pronounced trends in return correlations between off-index commodities and oil, we add two 
lags of oil return in the regression to control for illiquidity:   25 
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For the two lagged oil returns     ,   
   and     ,   
  , we also use the same trend specification as in 
the coefficient of the contemporaneous oil return. With the lags, the effective return correlation 
between a commodity and oil is determined by the sum of the coefficients of     , 
  ,     ,   
  , and  
    ,   
  . Then the hypothesis that return correlations of indexed commodities with oil have more 
pronounced trends after 2004 than off-index commodities is equivalent to that              is 
significantly positive. We use the F-statistic to test the null hypothesis that               0 .  
 Table 5 reports the regression results after adding the two lags of oil return. The estimates of 
the coefficients related to the second lag are all close to zero, suggesting that two lags are 
sufficient. We have also used more lags and their coefficients are all negligible. Interestingly, the 
estimates of              are positive in both of the pre-crisis period and full sample period, with 
or without the control variables. In particular, in the pre-crisis sample period the estimates of the 
two lagged trends    and    are both close to zero and the F-statistic rejects the null hypothesis 
that               0  with 95% confidence. In the full sample period, the estimate of    becomes 
significantly negative, but the estimate of               remains positive. The F-statistic still 
rejects the null hypothesis with 95% confidence in the absence of the control variables, although 
the F-statistic becomes less significant after the control variables are added.
21 Taken together, 
Table 5 demonstrates that the difference-in-difference result between the return correlations of 
indexed and off-index commodities with oil is robust to the illiquidity concern about off-index 
commodities.   
We have also examined correlations between trading volume of different commodities. 
Consistent with the increasing presence of index investors in commodities markets, we find a 
significant increasing trend in trading volume correlations between indexed non-energy 
                                                            
21 It is conceivable that during the crisis, market liquidity deteriorated, especially for the off-index commodities. As 
a result, the crisis effect after September 2008, which is captured by the control variables, dominated the effect of 
index investment and made it less significant. 26 
 
commodities and oil after 2004 even though the existence of such trend is not clear for off-index 
commodities. To save space, we do not report this set of results in the paper.   
D.  Spot and Roll Returns 
So far, our analysis focuses on returns of rolling front-month futures contracts of different 
commodities. As highlighted by Erb and Harvey (2006), these returns have two components: 
spot return (i.e., return from a commodity’s spot price) and the so-called roll return (which 
originates from the commodity’s futures price curve). Suppose that the curve is in backwardation 
(i.e., downward sloping). Then besides the spot return, rolling the front-month futures contract 
also yields a positive roll return from the increase in the contract price as its maturity shortens. 
Conversely, the roll return is negative if the curve is in contango (i.e., upward sloping). It is 
intuitive that the roll return fluctuates with the slope of the futures price curve. Erb and Harvey 
(2006) show that roll returns contribute to a significant fraction of the historically high average 
return to GSCI index because many commodities in the index tend to be, although not always, in 
backwardation. Given the important distinction between these two components, it is interesting 
to separately examine their roles in driving our result on the increasing return correlations 
between non-energy commodities and oil.  
We first analyze the spot-return correlations of non-energy commodities with oil. Due to the 
lack of centralized spot markets for commodities, spot prices are often not readily available. We 
acquired spot prices for a set of commodities from Pinnacle Data Corp., the same data vendor 
that provided us with the futures price data. The set includes oil and 16 non-energy commodities 
(8 short of the non-energy commodities with futures listed in Table 1). These non-energy 
commodities include corn, soybeans, wheat, Kansas wheat, soybean oil, Minnesota wheat, and 
oats from the grain sector; cotton and sugar from the soft sector; live cattle and lean hogs from 
the livestock sector; and gold, silver, copper, platinum, and palladium from the metal sector. We 
pool together their daily spot returns and regress them on spot return of oil and the set of control 
variables based on the regression specified in (3). The estimates of coefficients    and    are 
reported in Panel A of Table 6. The estimate of    is positive and significant in the pre-crisis 
period but becomes insignificant in the full sample period. More interestingly, the estimate of    
is positive and significant in both of the pre-crisis period and full sample period, confirming the 
same difference-in-difference result in spot returns as in returns of rolling front-month futures 
contracts. This result implies that the price effect generated by the growing commodity index 
investment in recent years is also present in spot prices of commodities.  
As fluctuations of roll returns are driven by slope changes of futures price curves, we now 
examine the slope-change correlations between non-energy commodities and oil. We define the 
slope of commodity  ’s futures price curve as the difference between the logarithm of its second-27 
 
month futures price (with maturity   ) and the logarithm of its front-month futures price (with 
maturity   ) normalized by the difference in the two maturities (       ): 
  ,   
 
T  T 
ln   , ,    /  , ,    . 
We compute the slope by the difference between the second and front-month futures prices 
rather than between the front-month futures price and spot price so that we can employ the larger 
sample of non-energy commodities with futures contracts listed in Table 1. We pool together 
daily slope changes of these commodities and regress them on slope change of oil by using the 
following difference-in-difference specification: 
                     ∆  ,                   2004                  2004               ∆    ,      , .       (5) 
As before, coefficient    captures the trend after 2004 in the slope-change correlations of off-
index non-energy commodities with oil, and coefficient     captures the additional trend for 
indexed commodities.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports the regression results. The estimates of    and    are small and 
insignificant in both of the pre-crisis period and full sample period, indicating no evidence of 
increased slope-change correlations between non-energy commodities and oil after 2004 and no 
evidence of any difference between indexed and off-index commodities. This result implies that 
the increasing presence of index investors after 2004 did not systematically affect the slopes of 
commodity futures curves; this is probably because arbitrageurs were able to effectively spread 
out the price impact of index investment across the curves. This result also suggests that the 
increased return correlations between non-energy commodities and oil after 2004 were mostly 
driven by spot returns rather than roll returns.    
V.  Volatility Spillover 
Our earlier analysis confirms that the rapid growth of commodity index investment after 
2004 had a significant impact on commodities markets and caused prices of seemingly unrelated 
commodities to move together. This effect is a reflection of an ongoing financialization process, 
through which the previously (partially) segmented commodities markets became more 
integrated with outside financial markets and with each other. While this process may have led to 
a more efficient sharing of commodity price risk, it can also act as a channel to spill over 28 
 
volatility from outside financial markets to commodities markets and across different 
commodities markets.
22 We now discuss this spillover effect.  
Figure 13 depicts the annualized daily return volatility of oil, GSCI non-energy excess return 
index, and Morgan Stanley world equity index estimated from one-year rolling windows. The 
GSCI non-energy excess return index tracks price fluctuations of GSCI commodities in the four 
non-energy sectors. Morgan Stanley world equity index tracks the equity market performance of 
both developed and emerging economies. The figure shows that oil price is always volatile. 
During most of 1990s and 2000s, its volatility was at least twice as high as the volatility of the 
world equity index. Oil return volatility shot up from around 30% to near 60% in 2008, a level 
that had caused great public concerns. However, this is not the first time for oil return volatility 
to reach this level –  it also happened in early 1990s during the Gulf war. More interestingly, 
while return volatility of non-energy commodities had been very stable at a level around 10% 
throughout 1990s and early 2000s, it started to rise after 2004 and peaked at an unprecedented 
level of 27% in 2008. This is concurrent with the hikes in volatility of oil and the world equity 
index.  
Different factors may have contributed to the large volatility increase in oil and non-energy 
commodities. First, the world economic recession that accompanied the recent financial crisis 
has made commodity demands more uncertain and thus prices more volatile. Second, the 
financial crisis which initially disrupted in the markets for mortgage-backed securities eroded 
balance sheets of many financial institutions and eventually hurt the risk appetite of financial 
investors for many seemingly unrelated assets in their portfolios including commodities (e.g., 
Kyle and Xiong (2001)). To identify the latter spillover effect, we analyze the difference between 
return volatility of indexed and off-index non-energy commodities from 1/2/1998 to 10/29/2009.  
Specifically, we first normalize the daily return of each commodity (return of rolling its first-
month futures contract) by its volatility before 2004 and its whole sample mean. After the 
normalization, the return series of all non-energy commodities have the same volatility before 
2004. We then analyze changes of volatilities after 2004 by regressing the pooled squared 
normalized returns onto a set of year dummies for each year after 2004 and their interaction 
terms with an index dummy for whether a given commodity is in at least one of GSCI and DJ-
UBS indices: 
   , 
   
 
                                                                          (6) 
         +                                                 
                                                            
22 See Bekaert and Harvey (1997) for an analysis of volatility spillover after financial liberalization of emerging 
equity markets.   29 
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The squared return is a widely used proxy for return volatility. The coefficients    ,    ,    ,    , 
   , and     measure the baseline volatility changes of off-index commodities in each of the 
years after 2004, while the coefficients    ,    ,    ,    ,    , and      measure the additional 
volatility increase of indexed commodities relative to off-index commodities in each of the years. 
Table 7 reports the regression results. It shows that the estimates of coefficients     and     are 
positive and significant, indicating significant baseline volatility increase in years 2008 and 2009 
across the commodities. Interestingly, the estimates of coefficients    ,    ,    ,     and     are 
all positive and significant, indicating that indexed commodities exhibited larger volatility 
increases than those off-index commodities in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. This result is 
consistent with a spillover effect that the presence of index investors has contributed to the large 
increase of commodity price volatility in recent years. 
The volatility spillover could originate from uncertainty about the economy, turmoil in stock 
markets and bond markets, or shocks to oil prices. It is difficult to identify the source because the 
exogenous shocks are unobservable. Following our earlier analysis, we focus on the possible 
spillover of oil price volatility to non-energy commodities through the largely increased return 
correlations between non-energy commodities and oil. From non-energy commodity returns, we 
first filter out the control variables we have used before (i.e., returns of Morgan Stanley 
emerging market index, S&P 500 stock index, JP Morgan Treasury bond index, and US dollar 
index, CPI core inflation rate, and change of the global shipping index) and then oil return by 
using the following regression specification:  
                                        2004     ,                      2004     ,           (7) 
                               2004      ,                      2004      ,  
                           2004      ,                      2004      ,  
                                              2004      ,                     
We have used a similar specification to analyze GSCI index return. Since we only have monthly 
observations on CPI inflation rate and the global shipping index, we treat     ,  and     ,  as 
constant during a month. Depending on whether we include oil return in the regression, we 
obtain two sets of residual returns, one after filtering out only the control variables and the other 
after filtering out the control variables and oil return. As we discussed before, the control 
variables serve to filter out the potential effects of economic uncertainty, as well as possible 
spillover of stock market volatility and US dollar volatility to commodities. These controls, 
while potentially excessive, allow us to highlight spillover of oil price volatility to indexed non-
energy commodities. 30 
 
We then repeat the difference-in-difference analysis of regression (6) using the two sets of 
residual returns. The results are also reported in Table 7. After filtering out only the control 
variables from non-energy commodity returns, the estimates of coefficients    ,    ,    ,      and 
     are substantially reduced, although    ,    ,     and      are still positive and significant. 
After further filtering out oil return, the estimates of coefficients    ,    ,    ,     and     are 
further reduced, and the estimates of     and     are now insignificant. These reductions indicate 
that the spillover of oil price volatility through index investment contributed to the greater 
volatility increase of indexed non-energy commodities in 2007 and 2008.  
Overall, we find that non-energy commodities in the GSCI and DJ-UBS indices had 
significantly greater volatility increase than off-index commodities in 2008. In particular, the 
greater volatility increase of indexed commodities was related to their greater return correlations 
with oil. These results suggest that trading of commodity index investors can act as a channel for 
spilling over price volatility to commodities markets.  
VI.  Conclusion 
This paper finds that concurrent with the rapid growth of index investment to commodities 
markets, prices of non-energy commodities became increasingly correlated with oil prices and 
this trend is significantly more pronounced for commodities in the two popular GSCI and DJ-
UBS indices. This finding reveals a fundamental process of financialization amongst 
commodities markets, through which commodity prices became more correlated with prices of 
financial assets and with each other. This result also helps explain the synchronized price boom 
and bust of a large set of seemingly unrelated commodities in 2006-2008.  
Our analysis suggests that as a result of the financialization process, the price of an individual 
commodity is no longer simply determined by its supply and demand. Instead, prices are also 
determined by a whole set of financial factors such as the aggregate risk appetite for financial 
assets, and investment behavior of diversified commodity index investors. This fundamental 
change is likely to persist as long as commodity index investment remains popular among 
financial investors and has profound implications for a wide range of issues from commodity 
producers’ hedging strategies and speculators’ investment strategies to many countries’ energy 
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Figure 1: Commodity Prices 
This figure depicts price appreciations of five commodities, oil, soybeans, cotton, live cattle, and copper, 
since January 1991. We normalize price of each commodity in January 1991 to be 100. 
 34 
 
Figure 2: Rolling Return Correlation of Oil with Different Non-energy Commodities 
This figure depicts one-year rolling return correlation of oil with soybean, cotton, live cattle, and copper, 
together with the 95% confidence interval, in Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. Panel E plots one-year 






Figure 3: Average Correlations of Indexed and Off-index Commodities 
This figure depicts average return correlations of commodities in the GSCI and DJ-UBS indices and 
commodities off these indices. We separate the samples of indexed and off-index commodities. In each 
sample, we construct an equal-weighted return index for each commodity sector. A commodity is not 
included into the index until its average daily futures trading volume in a certain calendar year is larger 
than 20 million dollars. Then, for both indexed and off-index commodities, we compute equal-weighted 
average of one-year rolling return correlations of all sector pairs.    
 
 
Figure 4: Rolling Return Correlations of GSCI with Emerging Market and US Dollar Indices 
This figure depicts one-year rolling return correlation of the GSCI excess return index with the Morgan 
Stanley emerging market index in Panel A and with the US dollar index in Panel B. 
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Figure 5: Commodity Prices in China and the US 
This figure depicts front-month futures prices of 6 commodities---heating oil, copper, soybeans, wheat, 






Figure 6: Commodity Return Correlations in China and the US 
This figure depicts average commodity return correlations in China and the US based on a sample of 8 
commodities, which are listed in Table 1 and which have futures contracts simultaneously traded in both 
countries.   
 
Figure 7: Open Interest of Commodity Futures Contracts 
This figure depicts the total open interest of futures contracts with maturities less than one year of five 
commodities, oil, soybeans, cotton, live cattle, and copper, since January 1991. We normalize the open 
interest of each commodity in January 1991 to be 100. 
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Figure 8: Accumulated Index Flow and GSCI Agriculture & Livestock Excess Return Index 
This figure depicts the accumulated index flow to the 12 agricultural and livestock commodities covered 
by the CIT report of CFTC, together with the GSCI agriculture & livestock excess return index. The 
weekly flow to each of the commodities is computed according to (1), and the accumulated flow to the 
commodity is computed by adding up the weekly flow from the first week of 2006 to a given week. By 
summing up the accumulated flow to the 12 commodities, we obtain the accumulated index flow.  
 
 
Figure 9: VIX Index 
This figure depicts the VIX index (the Chicago Board Options Exchange volatility index), a widely used 
equity market volatility measure derived from the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. 
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Figure 10: Return Correlation between GSCI and S&P Stock Indices 
This figure depicts one-year rolling correlation of daily returns of the GSCI and S&P 500 stock indices. 
 
 
Figure 11: Inflation and Inflation Volatility 
This figure depicts the annualized monthly CPI core inflation rate (excluding food and energy prices) and 





Figure 12: The Difference-in-Difference Specification 
This figure illustrates the difference-in-difference specification for individual commodities’ regression 
coefficient of any independent variable in regression (3). For example, the coefficient of oil return is  










Figure 13: Volatility of Oil, GSCI Non-Energy Index, and Morgan Stanley World Equity Index 
This figure depicts one-year rolling volatility of daily returns of oil, the GSCI non-energy excess return 
index, and the Morgan Stanley world equity index.  
  
     slope    







Table 1: Commodity Futures Traded in US and Weights in the GSCI and DJ-UBS Indices 
This table lists all of the commodities with futures contracts traded in the U.S. The weights of these 
commodities in the GSCI and DJ-UBS contracts are taken from 2008.
23 
Commodities  GSCI  DJ-
UBS  Exchange  Contracts 
Start of futures 
in US 
Start of futures 
in China 
Energy (4 Commodities)
WTI Crude Oil  40.6 15.0% NYMEX  Every  month  03/30/1983  
Heating Oil  5.3%  4.5%  NYMEX  Every month  11/14/1978  8/25/2004 
RBOB Gasoline  4.5%  4.1%  NYMEX  Every month  04/18/2006  
Natural Gas  7.6%  16.0%  NYMEX  Every month  04/04/1990   
Grains (9 commodities) 
Corn  3.6%  6.9%  CME Group  Mar, May , Jul, Sep & Dec  07/01/1959  09/22/2004 
Soybeans 0.9%  7.4%  CME  Group  Jan,  Mar, May , Jul, Aug, Sep, Nov  07/01/1959 01/04/1999 
Chicago Wheat   3.0%  3.4%  CME Group  Mar, May , Jul, Sep, Dec  07/01/1959  01/04/1999 
Kansas Wheat   0.7%  0  KCBT
24   Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec   01/05/1970  
Soybean Oil  0  2.9%  CME Group  Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Dec  07/01/1959   
Minn. Wheat   0  0  MGE
25   Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec  01/05/1970  
Soybean Meal  0  0  CME Group  Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Dec  07/01/1959   
Rough Rice  0  0  CME Group  Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Nov  08/20/1986  
Oats  0  0  CME Group  Mar, May, July, Sep, Dec  07/01/1959   
Softs (6 Commodities) 
Coffee  0.5%  2.7%  ICE  Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec  08/16/1972   
Cotton  0.7%  2.2%  ICE  Mar, May, Jul, Oct, Dec  07/01/1959 06/01/2004 
Sugar  2.1%  2.8%  ICE  Mar, May, Jul, Oct  01/04/1961  01/06/2006 
Cocoa  0.2%  0  ICE  Mar , May, Jul, Sep, Dec  07/01/1959  
Lumber  0  0  CME Group  Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Nov  10/01/1969   
Orange Juice  0  0  ICE  Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Nov  02/01/1967  
Livestock (4 Commodities) 
Feeder Cattle  0.3%  0.0%  CME Group  Jan, Mar, Apr, May, Aug, Sep, Oct,  11/30/1971   
Lean Hogs
26  0.8%  2.5%  CME Group  Feb, Apr, May, Jul, Aug, Oct, Dec  02/28/1966   
Live Cattle  1.6%  4.1%  CME Group  Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, Oct, Dec  11/30/1964  
Pork Bellies  0  0  CME Group  Feb, Mar, May, Jul, Aug  09/18/1961   
Metals (5 Commodities) 
Gold
27  1.5%  6.1%  NYMEX  Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, Oct, Dec  12/31/1974  01/01/2008 
Silver 0.2%  2.4%  NYMEX  Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec  06/12/1963  
Copper
28  2.6%
  6.7%  NYMEX  Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec  01/03/1989  05/12/1997 
Platinum  0  0  NYMEX  Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct  03/04/1968  
Palladium  0  0  NYMEX  Mar, Jun, Sep, and Dec  01/03/1977   
                                                            
23 The GSCI and DJ-UBS indices also include commodities traded in London, which are not included in our analysis. 
24 Kansas City Board of Trade. 
25 Minneapolis Grain Exchange. 
26 A June contract has been added to the Lean Hog Futures series since 2002. As this new contract has a low open 
interest, we omit this contract in our analysis. 
27 For gold, silver, platinum, and palladium, contracts include the current month and the next two consecutive 
months, plus those contracts listed in the table. However, because the open interest of those short-maturity contracts 
(with maturities less than 3 months) is typically small, we omit these contracts in our analysis. 
28 The GSCI Index uses the copper contracts traded on LME, while the DJ-UBS Index uses those from NYMEX. 
We follow the convention of the DJ-UBS index and choose Mar, May, Jul, Sep and Dec for copper contracts in our 
analysis. 42 
 
Table 2: The Commodity Index Traders Report 
This table summarizes the Commodity Index Traders (CIT) report released by the CFTC, which is 
reported on each Friday regarding a breakdown of the prior Tuesday’s positions for 12 agricultural 
commodities. The sample period covers from 1/2/2006 to 10/29/2009. We calculate the position of each 
reported category in each commodity relative to the total open interest, and then calculate the mean across 
the whole sample period.  
 




Long  Short  Long  Short  Spread  Long  Short 
Chicago 
Wheat  41.6%  3.6%  10.6% 14.8% 28.2% 12.1% 40.6% 
Kansas 
Wheat  22.7%  0.7%  22.2%  7.8%  13.8%  23.7%  54.5% 
Corn 23.4%  1.7%  12.2%  5.9%  29.7%  23.4%  45.4% 
Soybean  25.6%  1.7%  13.6%  7.6%  29.1%  20.0%  44.3% 
Soybean 
Oil  23.6% 1.2% 14.3% 8.5% 23.0%  29.2%  60.1% 
Cotton  32.2%  1.2%  13.3%  10.8%  27.1%  19.1%  55.8% 
Lean  Hogs 42.4%  1.1%  12.0% 15.7% 25.0%  8.8% 40.4% 
Live Cattle  38.7%  0.7%  16.2%  12.6%  23.1%  12.9%  43.4% 
Feeder 
Cattle  25.0%  1.3%  23.0% 16.3% 17.9% 15.5% 20.9% 
Cocoa  12.7%  0.9%  27.7%  13.5%  11.6%  40.5%  69.6% 
Sugar 27.7%  4.8%  11.7%  6.2%  22.5%  28.5%  59.4% 
Coffee  25.0%  0.8%  17.0%  12.2%  28.7%  22.7%  53.7% 





Table 3: Regressions of GSCI Index Return 
This table reports regressions of return of the GSCI excess return index on returns of the Morgan Stanley 
emerging market equity index (   ,  , the S&P 500 US stock index (   ,  , the JP Morgan Treasury 
bond index      , ), and the US dollar index (    ,  , CPI inflation rate      , ), and change of the 
global shipping index      , ), separately and jointly. We normalize each variable by its sample mean 
and standard deviation. The data sample goes from 1/4/1988 to 10/29/2009. The regression specification 
is given in (2). Panel A reports the daily regression results based on the first four independent variables 
mentioned above, and Panel B reports the monthly results based on all of the six variables. For inflation 
rate, we separately report results based on CPI inflate rate and CPI core inflation rate (which excludes 
food and energy prices). Each panel reports results for the pre-crisis period from 1/4/1988 to 8/31/2008 
and for the full sample period. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
using the Newey-West method with five lags.  
Panel A: Regressions of Daily GSCI Return 
    Regression (1)  Regression (2)  Regression (3)  Regression (4)  Regression (5) 
    estimate  t-stat  estimate  t-stat  estimate  t-stat  estimate  t-stat  estimate  t-stat 
  The Pre-Crisis Period (1/4/1988 to 8/31/2008) 
      0.00 -0.34 0.00 -0.31 0.00 -0.29 0.00 -0.33 0.00 -0.26 




    -0.01  -0.45              0.00  0.14 
    0.07  5.52              0.06  5.00 
Link to S&P 
500 index 
       -0.06  -2.65       -0.06  -2.80 
       0.00  0.07       -0.01  -0.89 
Link to bond  
index 
            -0.06  -3.08      -0.06  -3.06 
            0.01  0.76      -0.01  -0.88 
Link to US 
dollar index   
           -0.02  -0.74  -0.01  -0.60 
           -0.14  -6.68  -0.13  -6.43 
      1.20%  0.42%  0.30%  1.93%  3.59% 
  The Full Sample Period (1/4/1988 to 10/29/2009) 
      0.00 0.37 0.01 0.43 0.01 0.41 0.00 0.38 0.01 0.47 




    -0.02  -0.68              0.01  0.21 
    0.10  8.95              0.06  5.63 
Link to S&P 
500 index 
       -0.08  -3.26       -0.07  -3.20 
       0.09  8.29       0.03  3.15 
Link to bond  
index 
            -0.05  -2.61      -0.05  -2.70 
            -0.04  -2.47      -0.03  -2.38 
Link to US 
dollar index   
           -0.02  -0.90  -0.02  -0.91 
           -0.11  -6.70  -0.07  -4.91 
      7.47%  4.86%  1.09%  5.10%  10.82% 
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Panel B: Regressions of Monthly GSCI Return 
    Reg (1)  Reg (2)  Reg (3)  Reg (4)  Reg (5)  Reg (6)  Reg (7)     
    est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat 
  The Pre-Crisis Period (1/4/1988 to 8/31/2008) 
      -0.02 -0.26 -0.01 -0.21 -0.01 -0.13 -0.02 -0.24 -0.02  -0.28  -0.02  -0.22  0.09  1.47  0.12  1.92 
      0.08 0.49 0.06 0.38 0.05 0.31 0.04 0.27  0.08  0.49  0.09  0.56  -0.35  -1.60  -0.52  -2.38 
Link to emerging 
market index 
    -0.02  -0.24                          0.04  0.57 
    0.07  1.50                          0.10  1.37 
Link to S&P 500 
index 
       -0.15  -1.53                 -0.18  -1.72 
       -0.02  -0.36                 -0.05  -0.68 
Link to bond  
index 
            -0.18  -3.09                  -0.16  -2.54 
            0.03  0.64                  -0.11  -2.82 
Link to US dollar 
index   
           -0.06  -0.68             -0.07  -0.88 
           -0.16  -4.80             -0.16  -3.11 
Link to 
inflation rate 
                     -0.07  -1.20             
                     0.04  0.97             
Link to core 
inflation rate 
                         -0.04  -0.75      -0.02  -0.45 
                         0.07  1.58      0.05  1.14 
Link to global 
econ activity 
                    0.25  2.28  0.28  2.71 
                    -0.01  -0.24  -0.02  -0.69 
      0.93%  2.94%  2.88%  7.32%  0.6%  0.49%  2.19%  18.11% 
  The Full Sample Period (1/4/1988 to 10/29/2009) 
      0.03 0.39 0.03 0.52 0.05 0.78 0.04 0.66 0.03  0.40  0.03  0.42  0.15  2.33  0.17  2.94 
      -0.09 -0.53 -0.06 -0.33 -0.20 -0.79 -0.15 -0.79 -0.07  -0.38  -0.07  -0.35  -0.66  -2.22  -0.62  -4.13 
Link to emerging 
market index 
    -0.03  -0.35                                0.04  0.58 
    0.14  3.97                                0.05  0.76 
Link to S&P 500 
index 
          -0.18  -1.76                          -0.19  -1.81 
          0.13  3.59                          0.06  1.08 
Link to bond  
index 
                -0.18  -3.16                    -0.16  -2.65 
                0.03  0.85                    -0.04  -1.46 
Link to US dollar 
index   
                      -0.05  -0.70              -0.07  -0.99 
                      -0.16  -3.98              -0.12  -2.07 
Link to 
inflation rate 
                     -0.08  -1.36             
                     0.10  2.97             
Link to core 
inflation rate 
                                 -0.04  -0.74        -0.02  -0.38 
                                 0.10  1.84        0.03  0.63 
Link to global 
econ activity 
                                      0.28  2.51  0.29  3.27 
                                      0.04  1.35  0.01  0.30 




Table 4: Regressions of Daily Futures Returns of Non-energy Commodities 
This table reports regression results of daily returns of front-month futures contracts of non-energy 
commodities on oil return (    ,  , separately and jointly with a set of control variables, including returns 
of the Morgan Stanley emerging market equity index (   ,  , the S&P equity index (   ,  , the JP 
Morgan Treasury bond index      , ), and the US dollar index (    ,  : 
  , 
                   2004                  2004                   , 
   
               +  κ    κ       2004          κ       2004                  , 
   
               +               2004                  2004                  , 
   
                +              2004                  2004                   , 
   
                      +              2004                  2004                   , 
      ,  
We normalize each variable by its sample mean and standard deviation. The data sample goes from 
1/2/1998 to 10/29/2009. We report the results of each regression for the pre-crisis period from 1/4/1988 to 
8/31/2008 and for the whole sample period. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation using the Newey-West method with five lags. Panel A reports regression results for the full 
sample with all non-energy commodities. To save space, we skip the estimates for κ  ’s,    ’s,    ’s, and 
   ’s in panel A. Panel B separately reports the estimates of the main variables of interests    and    in 
different subsamples of commodities, including the soybean complex (which includes soybeans, soybean 
meal and soybean oil), the grain sector, the soft sector, the livestock sector, and the metal sector, with the 
control variables.   
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Panel A: Full Sample with All Non-Energy Commodities 
    
The Pre-Crisis Period 
(1/2/1998 to 8/31/2008) 
The Full Sample Period 
(1/2/1998 to 10/29/2009) 
est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat 
α     0.00  0.03  0.00  -0.08  0.00  0.75  0.00  0.42 
Link of individual 
commodity with oil before 
2004 
   Corn  0.07  4.17  0.07  4.39  0.09  4.69  0.09  5.07 
   Wheat  0.04  2.36  0.05  2.62  0.06  2.98  0.07  3.48 
   Kansas Wheat  0.04  2.43  0.05  2.76  0.06  3.03  0.07  3.70 
   Soybean  0.06  3.34  0.06  3.25  0.09  4.55  0.08  4.50 
   Soybean Oil  0.05  2.69  0.05  2.54  0.11  5.01  0.09  4.94 
   Live Cattle  -0.02  -0.88  -0.01  -0.39  -0.01  -0.54  0.00  0.23 
   Lean Hogs  0.00  -0.07  0.01  0.28  -0.05  -2.26  -0.02  -0.88 
   Feed Cattle  -0.07  -3.78  -0.06  -3.15  -0.06  -2.87  -0.04  -1.95 
   Gold  0.15  7.09  0.12  6.57  0.08  3.34  0.07  3.45 
   Silver  0.12  5.93  0.09  5.10  0.10  4.00  0.06  2.96 
   Copper  0.10  5.02  0.09  4.78  0.16  6.87  0.12  5.75 
   Coffee  -0.03  -1.06  -0.02  -1.02  -0.04  -1.84  -0.04  -1.58 
 β0i   Cocoa  -0.02  -0.81  -0.02  -0.83  -0.03  -1.17  -0.02  -1.19 
   Cotton  0.04  1.90  0.04  2.13  0.04  2.12  0.05  2.61 
   Sugar  0.02  1.06  0.03  1.23  0.02  0.90  0.03  1.58 
   Rough Rice  0.02  0.81  0.02  0.99  0.02  0.81  0.03  1.38 
   Soybean Meal  0.05  2.72  0.05  2.57  0.07  3.35  0.07  3.35 
   Oat  0.02  0.76  0.02  0.73  0.04  2.02  0.04  2.00 
   Minn Wheat  0.06  3.39  0.06  3.56  0.09  4.46  0.09  4.91 
   Orange Juice  -0.02  -1.07  -0.01  -0.53  -0.03  -1.32  0.00  -0.21 
   Lumber  -0.02  -1.07  -0.02  -0.89  -0.03  -1.70  -0.03  -1.54 
   Platinum  0.09  4.85  0.08  4.16  0.11  4.81  0.08  3.89 
   Palladium  0.03  1.60  0.02  1.03  0.04  2.02  0.02  1.09 
   Pork Belly  -0.02  -0.90  -0.01  -0.60  -0.06  -2.62  -0.03  -1.38 
Trend with oil after 2004   
β1      0.06  10.48  0.04  8.21  0.05  15.14  0.03  8.81 
β2      0.02  3.55  0.02  2.61  0.02  5.01  0.02  4.26 
Trend with emerging 
market index after 2004   
κ   0.02  4.41      0.02  5.12 
κ   0.00  -0.39      -0.01  -1.88 
Trend with S&P 500 index 
after 2004 
    -0.01  -1.09      -0.01  -3.03 
    0.00  0.27      0.00  0.99 
Trend with bond index 
after 2004 
    -0.01  -1.48      -0.01  -1.77 
    -0.01  -0.91      0.00  -0.10 
Trend with US dollar after 
2004 
    -0.01  -1.10      -0.01  -3.67 
    -0.02  -2.47      -0.01  -1.41 




Panel B: Estimates of β1 and β2 in Different Commodity Sectors 
 
 
The Pre-Crisis Period 
(1/2/1998 to 8/31/2008)
The Full Sample Period 
(1/2/1998 to 10/29/2009)
est  t-stat  est  t-stat 
Soybean Complex 
β1  0.07  4.29  0.05  4.51 
β2  0.06  2.90  0.04  3.08 
Grain Sector 
β1  0.06  6.84  0.05  4.51 
β2  0.04  3.21  0.04  3.08 
Soft Sector 
β1  0.02  2.07  0.02  2.71 
β2  0.02  1.56  0.02  2.11 
Livestock Sector 
β1  0.00  0.26  0.00  -0.26 
β2  0.01  0.35  0.03  2.91 
Metal Sector 
β1  0.05  5.42  0.03  4.20 




Table 5: Regressions of Daily Futures Returns of Non-energy Commodities with Lags 
This table reports regression results of daily returns of first-month futures contracts of non-energy 
commodities on oil return (    ,  , separately and jointly with a set of control variables, including returns 
of the Morgan Stanley emerging market equity index (   ,  , the S&P equity index (   ,  , the JP 
Morgan Treasury bond index      , ), and the US dollar index (    ,  . We use two lags of oil return in 
the regression specification:  
  , 
                   2004                  2004                   , 
   
                    +               2004                  2004                   ,   
   
                                   2004                  2004                   ,   
   
                  +  κ    κ       2004          κ       2004                  , 
   
               +               2004                  2004                  , 
   
                +               2004                  2004                   , 
   
                         +              2004                  2004                   , 
      ,  
We normalize each variable by its sample mean and standard deviation. The sample goes from 1/2/1998 
to 10/29/2009. We report the results of each regression for the pre-crisis period from 1/4/1988 to 
8/31/2008 and for the whole sample period. The t-stats are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation using the Newey-West method with five lags. We only report the coefficients related to the 
trends with oil after 2004. We also report the F-statistic for testing               0  with 95% significance 
level as 2.71.      
      
   
 
The Pre-Crisis Period 
(1/2/1998 to 8/31/2008) 
The Full Sample Period 
(1/2/1998 to 10/29/2009) 
  No Controls  With Controls  No Controls  With Controls 
  est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat  est  t-stat 
Trend with oil after 2004   
Lag0 
β1   0.06  10.35  0.04  7.91  0.05  15.08  0.03  8.80 
β2   0.02  3.56  0.02  2.58  0.02  5.03  0.02  4.22 
Lag1 
β4   -0.01  -2.38  -0.01  -2.77  0.00  1.03  0.00  -0.70 
β5   0.00  0.09  0.00  -0.31  -0.01  -2.87  -0.01  -2.99 
Lag2 
β7   -0.01  -1.37  0.00  -0.66  0.00  -0.92  0.00  -0.79 
β8   0.00  0.63  0.00  0.60  0.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.11 




Table 6: Regression Analysis of Spot Returns and Slope Changes of Futures Curves 
This table reports regression results of daily spot returns and slope changes of futures curves. Panel A 
pools the daily spot returns of 16 non-energy commodities: corn, soybeans, wheat, Kansas wheat, 
soybean oil, Minnesota wheat, oats, cotton, sugar, live cattle, lean hogs, gold, silver, copper, platinum, 
and palladium, and regresses them on oil spot return and a set of control variables, including returns of the 
Morgan Stanley emerging market equity index, the S&P equity index, the JP Morgan Treasury bond 
index, and the US dollar index based on regression specification (3). Panel B pools together the daily 
slope changes of all non-energy commodities listed in Table 1 and regresses them on slope change of oil 
based on regression specification (5). For both Panels A and B, we report the results of each regression 
for the pre-crisis period from 1/4/1988 to 8/31/2008 and for the whole sample period. We only report the 
coefficients related to the trends with oil after 2004. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation using the Newey-West method with five lags.  
 
Panel A: Spot Returns 
 
The Pre-Crisis Period 
(1/2/1998 to 8/31/2008)
The Full Sample Period 
(1/2/1998 to 10/29/2009)
est  t-stat  est  t-stat 
β1  0.03  2.83  0.00  0.17 
β2  0.03  2.96  0.03  4.43 
 
Panel B: Slope Changes  
 
The Pre-Crisis Period 
(1/2/1998 to 8/31/2008)
The Full Sample Period 
(1/2/1998 to 10/29/2009)
est  t-stat  est  t-stat 
β1  0.01  1.30  0.00  0.08 





Table 7: Regression Analysis of Volatility of Non-energy Commodities 
We analyze volatility of daily returns of all non-energy commodities between 1/2/1998 and 10/29/2009. 
We normalize return of each commodity by its volatility before 2004 and its whole sample mean. We 
filter out from return of each commodity a set of control variables (including returns of the Morgan 
Stanley emerging market index, the S&P 500 index, the JP Morgan Treasury bond index, and the US 
dollar index, the core CPI inflation rate, and change of the global shipping index) and oil return by using 
regression specification (7). Then, we regress the normalized raw returns, the residual returns after 
filtering out the set of control variables, and the residual returns after filtering out the set of control 
variables and oil return onto a set of index and year dummies: 
   , 
   
 
                                                             
                                                       +                                                 
                                                           ,  
To save space, we only report estimates of coefficients related to changes of volatility in years after 2004. 
The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the Newey-West method 
with five lags. 
 
 
  Raw Returns  Residual Returns after 
Control Variables 
Residual Returns after 
Control Variables and 
Oil Return 
    estimate  t-stat estimate t-stat estimate  t-stat
Baseline 
Effects 
     0.25 3.52 0.19 2.84 0.19 2.85 
     -0.09  -1.62  -0.12  -2.18  -0.13  -2.29 
     -0.01 -0.15 -0.08 -1.36 -0.10 -1.58 
     -0.07  -1.16  -0.12  -2.09  -0.13  -2.21 
     1.45  10.80  1.10 9.40 0.96 8.70 




     0.34 3.55 0.26 2.84 0.25 2.74 
     0.09  1.26  0.07  1.07  0.06  0.93 
     0.54 4.63 0.45 4.44 0.38 4.06 
     0.25  3.35  0.17  2.35  0.14  1.93 
     0.68 3.42 0.43 2.55 0.24 1.59 
     0.37  2.88  0.22  1.90  0.14  1.29 
      4.5% 3.2% 2.6% 
 